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EXAMINING THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED THEORY AMONG 
THE U.S. FEDERAL CIRCUITS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE 




For more than twenty years, the U.S. federal circuits have struggled
to agree on a unified approach to the abduction sentencing 
enhancement in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 
2B3.1(b)(4)(A), which is a sentencing enhancement that specifically 
attaches to the underlying base crime of robbery in the event that an 
abduction took place in the course of the crime.1  The circuits are 
deeply divided on the issue of what constitutes abduction for the 
purpose of the sentencing enhancement.2  The Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and, most recently, the Tenth Circuits have all determined that the 
forced movement of victims from one area or room within a structure 
to another area or room within the same structure is satisfactory for 
the purpose of applying the abduction sentencing enhancement.3  In 
contrast, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have determined that 
movement within the same structure is not sufficient to apply the 
abduction sentencing enhancement; rather, the defendant must force 
a victim to enter, leave, or move between distinct structures before 
receiving the abduction enhancement.4  
Even when applied uniformly among the circuits, sentencing 
enhancements generally create ambiguity and a lack of uniformity in 
sentencing outcomes by virtue of prosecutorial discretion.5  In the 
case of the abduction sentencing enhancement, the deeply entrenched 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A. Political
Science and History, May 2014, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Special
thanks to my wonderful husband, Joey, who is my best friend and biggest fan; to my
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1. See infra Parts III, IV.
2. See infra Part IV.
3. See infra Section IV.B.
4. See infra Section IV.A.
5. See infra Section V.B.
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divide among the circuits introduces a further heightened degree of 
nonuniformity in sentencing.6  Therefore, the circuit split must be 
resolved in order to minimize sentencing disparity and maximize 
predictability within our justice system.7  To avoid the danger of 
double counting or stacking penalties for the same conduct, the 
abduction enhancement should be limited to circumstances in which 
the defendant forced victims to enter, leave, or move between distinct 
structures.8  Forced movement within the same structure should not 
constitute abduction for the purpose of the abduction enhancement 
and should instead trigger the physical restraint enhancement.9 
This Comment consists of six parts following this introduction. 
Part II details the historical and political background of the federal 
sentencing guidelines, giving particular attention to the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 and the period immediately preceding it known 
as the “age of indeterminate sentencing.”10  The examination of key 
changes in federal sentencing guidelines is essential to develop an 
understanding of the shifting public opinion in regards to the aim of 
imprisonment and of the function criminal sentencing is meant to 
fulfill within our society.11  An understanding of the purpose and 
design of the federal sentencing guidelines will later inform this 
Comment’s recommended solution to resolve the split among the 
nation’s federal circuits.12  
Part III of this Comment outlines the statutory construct of the 
abduction enhancement itself, as well as the closely related physical 
restraint enhancement, which may be applied in cases of the forceful 
restraint of victims undertaken in the course of a robbery.13 
Additionally, Part III provides a key contextual understanding of the 
interpretative conflict among the circuits by outlining definitional 
terms used to clarify the guidelines.14 
Part IV of this Comment investigates the various approaches taken 
by the circuits as each encountered case, all sharing similar fact 
patterns, demand an articulation of a stance on the abduction 
enhancement in crimes of robbery.15  Part IV also discusses the 
6. See infra Section V.C.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part VI.
9. See infra Section VI.C.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
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various responses the circuits have developed by considering the key 
cases of relevance.16   
Part V of this Comment carefully considers the stated goals of the 
federal sentencing guidelines and discusses both the broad 
implications of sentencing enhancements on these goals and the more 
focused implications of the nonuniformity of the application of the 
abduction enhancement on these goals.17  Part V exposes the 
necessity for a resolution of the circuit split on the issue of the 
abduction enhancement in order to maintain the integrity of 
congressional efforts to reduce sentencing disparity.18 
Finally, Part VI of this Comment defines and addresses the issue of 
double counting, which is of particular relevance in determining the 
appropriate resolution of the circuit court split on the issue of the 
abduction enhancement.19  Ultimately, the danger of double counting 
requires that the abduction enhancement must be distinguished from 
the physical restraint enhancement.20  Therefore, this Comment 
concludes by asserting that the circuit split must be decided in favor 
of construing the abduction enhancement to exclusively apply to 
situations in which the defendant has forced victims to enter, leave, 
or move between distinct structures.21 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Before considering the narrow issue this Comment addresses, 
namely the deeply divided application of the abduction sentencing 
enhancement among the federal appellate circuits, it is useful to first 
examine the genesis of our modern federal sentencing guidelines and 
the increasingly important role federal appellate courts have assumed 
in the interpretation of these guidelines.22  
A. The Age of Indeterminate Sentencing Prior to the Creation of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
 Prior to the major sentencing reform of the 1980s, trial courts 
exercised a great deal of discretion in sentencing and were only 
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.
20. See infra Section VI.C.
21. See infra Section VI.C.
22. See infra Sections II.A–C.
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fenced in by broad statutory margins.23  In what became known as 
the “age of ‘indeterminate’ sentencing,” there was no appellate 
review of sentencing, and the chief goal of sentencing was 
rehabilitation.24  During this era, it was widely believed that criminals 
suffered from a disease that could ultimately be cured through the 
intervention of well-intentioned criminal system actors, including 
judges, probation officers, and prison wardens.25  
In the 1949 capital case of Williams v. New York, the U.S. Supreme 
Court dramatically reinforced the immense discretion of trial judges 
in matters of sentencing.26  A jury convicted the defendant of first-
degree murder with the recommendation of life imprisonment.27  
However, the trial judge decided to instead sentence the defendant to 
death on the basis of information not considered in the trial, 
specifically an extensive criminal history and “morbid sexuality.”28 
The defendant unsuccessfully appealed the sentencing decision on 
the basis of a due process violation.29  Both the Court of Appeals of 
New York and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision.30  The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause 
should not be read as a “uniform command that courts throughout the 
Nation [must] abandon their age-old practice of seeking information 
from out-of-court sources.”31 
In response to the broad discretion aptly demonstrated in Williams 
v. New York, critical outcry against the indeterminate model of
sentencing began by the 1970s.32  Proponents of sentencing reform
argued that the immense discretion enjoyed by trial courts led to
arbitrary sentencing results, sometimes as a result of racial prejudice,
and that the goal of rehabilitation was not being realized.33  In
response to these concerns, among others, Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act).34
23. Elliot Edwards, Note, Eliminating Circuit-Split Disparities in Federal Sentencing
Under the Post-Booker Guidelines, 92 IND. L.J. 817, 818–19 (2017).
24. Id.
25. See J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-fifth
Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 699–700
(2011).
26. See Edwards, supra note 23, at 819.
27. Id.; see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–53 (1949).
28. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 242–44.
29. See id. at 243.
30. See id. at 243, 252.
31. Id. at 250–51.
32. See Edwards, supra note 23, at 819; see also Oleson, supra note 25, at 700.
33. See Edwards, supra note 23, at 819.
34. See id. at 819–20.
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B. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Creation of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The Act has been alleged to be “perhaps the most dramatic change 
in sentencing law and practice in our Nation’s history.”35  The Act 
was the culmination of a decade-long bipartisan effort36 to eliminate 
rehabilitation as the sole aim of imprisonment and instead, 
incorporate a four-fold philosophy giving equal weight to the aims of 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation in the 
determination of punishment.37  The Act embodied a distinct shift 
from the indeterminate sentencing heralded by the Supreme Court in 
Williams to determinate sentencing designed to “redress past wrongs 
. . . not to influence future conduct.”38  
To accomplish these aims, the Act implemented several sweeping 
changes.39  Firstly, appellate review of sentencing was granted, and 
secondly, federal parole was abolished in an effort to reduce 
uncertainty and inconsistency in sentencing.40  The Act also created a 
nonpartisan commission tasked with developing fair and uniform 
federal sentencing guidelines called the United States Sentencing 
Commission.41  
The Sentencing Commission was designed to be an insulated group 
of experts who would remain immune from political pressure.42  
However, the Commission was marked by fundamental 
disagreements, resulting in frequent shifts in leadership,43 and when 
the Commission released its first sentencing guidelines manual it was 
met with a refrain of constitutional attacks.44  Although the U.S. 
Supreme Court quieted many dissenters in Mistretta v. United States 
by declaring the guidelines constitutional,45 the guidelines are still 
35. Oleson, supra note 25, at 695.
36. Edward M. Kennedy, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 32 FED. B. NEWS & J. 62,
62 (1985).
37. See Oleson, supra note 25, at 696.
38. Id. at 701.
39. See Kennedy, supra note 36, at 62.
40. See id.
41. See id.; see also Edwards, supra note 23, at 820.
42. See Edwards, supra note 23, at 820.
43. See Oleson, supra note 25, at 704–05.
44. Edwards, supra note 23, at 820.
45. Id.; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
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criticized as being too severe46 and have even been labeled as a 
“catastrophe” by some.47  
C. The Elevated Role of Federal Appellate Courts in the
Interpretation of Sentencing Guidelines
While the guidelines were initially treated as law, the Supreme 
Court ruled that they were unconstitutional if made mandatory in 
United States v. Booker in 2005, effectively reducing the guidelines 
to advisory in nature.48  This major shift in function of the guidelines 
has resulted in a tension between the “two seats of sentencing 
discretion: the Sentencing Commission, whose Guidelines still carry 
procedural weight despite being advisory and whom Congress 
continues to direct to research and promulgate sentencing policy, and 
the federal district courts, who can freely vary from the Guidelines’ 
instructions when sentencing.”49  By extension, the federal appellate 
courts further influence sentencing within their circuits by their 
interpretation of the guidelines.50  
The Supreme Court formally recognized the Commission’s 
authority to revise and clarify the guidelines in Braxton v. United 
States and has proven to be reluctant to intervene for the purpose of 
resolving conflicting interpretations by various circuits.51  This leaves 
the Commission with the sole responsibility of fixing any ambiguity 
in the interpretation of the guidelines, and, as a result of the absence 
of active Supreme Court review, the federal appellate courts have 
successfully carved out substantial power to adjust sentencing 
guidelines through broad statutory interpretation.52  This is the 
precise power that many of the circuits have independently exercised 
in relation to the abduction enhancement found in § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) 
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the Guidelines), leading 
to an array of various approaches in interpretation.53 
46. Matthew G. White, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Too Blunt an Instrument?,
LAW360 (June 7, 2012, 1:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/347498 
[https://perma.cc/P9MW-QVPA].
47. Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, Guidelines as Guidelines: Lessons from the History of
Sentencing Reform, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 101, 102 (2010).
48. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005); see also Edwards, supra note
23, at 823.
49. Edwards, supra note 23, at 824.
50. Id.
51. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991); see Edwards, supra note 23,
at 825.
52. See Edwards, supra note 23, at 825–26.
53. See infra Part IV.
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ABDUCTION SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENT AND THE ALTERNATIVE PHYSICAL
RESTRAINT ENHANCEMENT FOUND IN § 2B3.1(B)(4)(A)
OF THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
Sentencing enhancements appear throughout federal criminal law, 
but they only apply if “the defendant has already committed some 
other underlying crime[,] . . . the prosecutor elects to charge it[,] and . 
. .  the sentencing enhancement has not been incorporated into the 
Guidelines calculation for the underlying crime.”54 
One such sentencing enhancement can be found in Chapter Two of 
the Guidelines.55  Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) of the Guidelines provides 
for an increase in the sentencing of robbery by four levels if “any 
person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to 
facilitate escape,” which is the abduction enhancement at issue.56  
Alternatively, an increase in sentencing by two levels may apply if 
“any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the 
offense or to facilitate escape,” which is the similar, but distinct, 
physical restraint enhancement.57  
Several pertinent definitions used by courts in the interpretation 
and application of these enhancements are outlined in Chapter One:58  
 The following are definitions of terms that are used 
frequently in the guidelines and are of general applicability 
(except to the extent expressly modified in respect to a 
particular guideline or policy statement):  
(A) “Abducted” means that a victim was forced to
accompany an offender to a different location.  For
example, a bank robber's forcing a bank teller from the bank
into a getaway car would constitute an abduction.
. . . . 
54. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing
Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 329 (2009).




58. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(A), (K).
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(K) “Physically restrained” means the forcible restraint of
the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.59
These definitional terms have proven to be susceptible to various 
interpretations ultimately resulting in a significant circuit court split 
on the appropriate application of the abduction enhancement.60  
IV. A SURVEY OF THE CURRENT CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON
THE ABDUCTION SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT AS
ATTACHED TO THE UNDERLYING CRIME OF ROBBERY
The federal appellate circuits have taken diverse approaches to the 
abduction sentencing enhancement as interpreted through the lens of 
the definition of “location.”61  The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 
have taken the position that the definition of abduction is not always 
satisfied when a defendant forces a victim from one room or area to 
another room or area in the same structure during the course of a 
robbery.62  On the other hand, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth 
Circuits have all taken the contradictory approach that the abduction 
enhancement does apply when a defendant forces a victim from one 
room or area to another room or area within the same structure.63 
These opposing views have formed significantly dissimilar 
sentencing outcomes for similarly situated defendants.64 
A. Circuits Finding that the Abduction Enhancement Does Not
Apply when a Defendant Forces a Victim from One Room or
Area to Another Room or Area Within the Same Structure
1. The Seventh Circuit
Beginning with the Seventh Circuit in 1992, the court began
fleshing out case law on the appropriate selection of a sentencing 
enhancement to attach to the conviction of robbery by considering 
the lesser enhancement of physical restraint.65  In an express rejection 
of an overly restrictive or too literal interpretation of the Guidelines § 
1B1.1 cmt. n.1(K), the court held in United States v. Doubet that 
forcing a bank teller at gunpoint from the teller’s counter to an 
59. Id.
60. See infra Part IV.
61. See infra notes 95−100 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Section IV.A.
63. See infra Section IV.B.
64. See infra notes 65–105 and accompanying text.
65. See United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 345–46 (7th Cir. 1992), abrogated by
United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2019).
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unlocked restroom in the back of the building constituted a physical 
restraint regardless of the fact that the victim had not been bound, 
tied, or locked up.66  
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit further established that forced entry 
from a parking lot to the interior of a building satisfied the 
definitional element of abduction requiring forced movement to 
another location.67  In United States v. Davis, the court held that a 
defendant who approached the branch supervisor of a credit union in 
the parking lot, who requested entry into the building prior to normal 
business hours but was denied, and who in turn forced the supervisor 
to enter the bank at gunpoint satisfied the definition of abduction for 
the purposes of the sentence enhancement.68   
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit expanded its interpretation of forced 
movement between locations to include movement that occurs while 
in a vehicle.69  United States v. Gail held that a defendant who forced 
victims at gunpoint to accompany him to various locations while the 
victims’ remained in their vehicles satisfied the abduction 
enhancement.70  
However, the Seventh Circuit wrestled with and ultimately rejected 
the leap that many other circuits have made in the 2010 decision of 
United States v. Eubanks.71  The court noted that the line between the 
two-level enhancement of physical restraint and the four-level 
enhancement of abduction was a “bit hazy.”72  Ultimately, the court 
decided that “transporting the victims from one room to another is 
simply not enough for abduction.  To find otherwise would virtually 
ensure that any movement of a victim from one room to another 
within the same building . . . would result in an abduction 
enhancement.”73 
66. Id. at 342, 346; see also United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a defendant that forced a bank teller at gunpoint from the vault to her
drawer constituted a restraint, not abduction).
67. See United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 278–79 (7th Cir. 1995).
68. See id.; see also United States v. Taylor, 128 F.3d 1105, 1110–11 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a defendant that forced an employee from the parking lot into the bank
at gunpoint constituted abduction).
69. See United States v. Gail, 116 F.3d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 1997).
70. Id.
71. See United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2010).
72. Id. at 652.
73. Id. at 654 (emphasis added).
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2. The Eleventh Circuit
Likewise in 2013, the Eleventh Circuit reached a similar
conclusion regarding the abduction enhancement in United States v. 
Whatley.74  The court held that a defendant who, in a series of bank 
robberies, forced bank employees to move from various locations 
within a branch to other locations within the same branch, such as the 
vault, did not satisfy the abduction enhancement.75  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit followed its sister circuits in taking a 
case-by-case approach rather than adopting a categorical rule.76  The 
court made an effort to avoid blurring the distinction between the 
physical restraint and abduction sentencing enhancements by 
determining that under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute 
different rooms in a single structure should not be considered 
different locations.77  
B. Circuits that Take the Position that Abduction Occurs when a
Defendant Forces an Individual from One Room or Area to
Another Room or Area Within the Same Structure
On the other end of the spectrum lie the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Tenth Circuits, all of which agree that the abduction sentencing 
enhancement is satisfied when a defendant forces an individual from 
one room or area to another room or area within the same structure.78  
1. The Third Circuit
In United States v. Reynos, the Third Circuit held that a defendant
who forced employees of a pizza shop from the bathroom to the cash 
register at gunpoint satisfied the abduction definition.79  Reynos 
articulated three elements needed to satisfy the abduction 
enhancement.80  First, the defendant must have forced the victim to 
move from his or her original position.81  Second, the victim must 
have accompanied the defendant to the new location.82  Lastly, the 
relocation must have been made to further the commission of the 
74. See United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2013).
75. See id. at 1208–12, 1222.
76. Id. at 1222.
77. See id. at 1222–23.
78. See infra Sections IV.B.1–4.
79. See United States v. Reynos, 680 F.3d 283, 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2012).
80. See id. at 286.
81. Id. at 286–87.
82. Id. at 287.
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crime or facilitate the defendant’s escape.83  By articulating these 
elements, the Third Circuit adopted a three-part test that attempted to 
maintain a degree of flexibility regarding the term location to avoid 
being “unduly legalistic” or overly “punctilious.”84 
2. The Fifth Circuit
In contrast to the Third Circuit’s articulation of specific elemental
requirements for the abduction enhancement,85 the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits have adopted an even greater degree of flexibility when 
considering the meaning of location and a stronger allegiance to the 
case-by-case approach.86  The Fifth Circuit initially interpreted the 
term location flexibly in the 1996 decision of United States v. 
Hawkins when it held that forced movement within a single parking 
lot at gunpoint constituted a change in location.87  The court rejected 
a mechanical construction of the term “based on the presence or 
absence of doorways, lot lines, thresholds and the like.”88  
Over the course of the next twenty years, the Fifth Circuit did not 
depart from this flexible approach.89  In United States v. Washington, 
the Fifth Circuit held that the movement of victims from room to 
room in a bank robbery constituted abduction.90  Again in United 
States v. Smith, the court specifically stated,  
[W]e have consistently held that “[t]he forced movement of
a bank employee from one room of a bank to another—so
long as it is in aid of commission of the offense or to
facilitate escape—is sufficient to support the enhancement
given the flexible approach we have adopted in this
circuit.”91
Most recently in 2017, the Fifth Circuit expanded this stance to 
incorporate buildings other than bank branches.92  In United States v. 
Buck, the court held that a defendant who forced phone store 
83. Id.
84. See id. at 290–91.
85. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
87. See United States v. Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722, 724–25, 727–28 (5th Cir. 1996).
88. See id. at 727–28.
89. See infra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
90. See United States v. Washington, 500 Fed. App’x 279, 285 (5th Cir. 2012).
91. United States v. Smith, 822 F.3d 755, 764 (5th Cir. 2016) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Washington, 500 Fed. App’x at 285).
92. See United States v. Buck, 847 F.3d 267, 276–77 (5th Cir. 2017).
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employees from the front of the store to the back of the store at 
gunpoint satisfied the abduction enhancement, stating “[w]e have 
repeatedly construed the ‘abduction’ enhancement as applicable 
when a victim is forced from one part of a building to another.  We 
have also indicated that the term ‘different location’ should be 
interpreted with flexibility.”93  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit has 
demonstrated consistency in its commitment to broadly interpreting 
the sentencing guidelines as they pertain to the abduction 
enhancement.94 
3. The Fourth Circuit
In remarkable parallel to the Fifth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit also
adopted a flexible approach to the abduction sentencing 
enhancement.95  In United States v. Osborne, the Fourth Circuit held 
that a defendant, who forced pharmacy employees from the secured 
pharmacy section to the front of a drugstore at knifepoint satisfied the 
definitional requirements of the abduction enhancement.96  The 
Fourth Circuit largely relied on the Fifth Circuit’s language in 
Hawkins to resolve the question of how to interpret the term location, 
holding that “movement within the confines of a single building can 
constitute movement ‘to a different location.’”97  Ultimately, the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have maintained the strongest pledge of all 
the circuits to search the facts of each case on an individualized basis 
with a willingness to interpret the definitional constraints of the 
enhancement liberally before determining if the abduction 
enhancement has been satisfied.98  
4. The Tenth Circuit
Finally, the Tenth Circuit has rounded out the circuit split by
recently aligning itself with the Third Circuit’s approach.99  In United 
States v. Archuleta, the Tenth Circuit confronted the heart of the 
division among the circuits in writing:100  
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 389–90 (4th Cir. 2008).
96. Id. at 381–82, 389–90.
97. Id. at 389–90 (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 1996)).
98. See supra notes 65–97 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 99–110 and
accompanying text.
99. See United States v. Archuleta, 865 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 2017).
100. See id. at 1287.
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 Considering all of these cases together, what appears to 
divide the circuits is a difference of opinion regarding the 
meaning of the term “location.”  As noted, § 1B1.1 defines 
the term “abducted” to mean “that a victim was forced to 
accompany an offender to a different location.”  Because the 
term “location” is not defined in the Guidelines, we must 
rely on the accepted rules of statutory construction in 
defining the term.  One of the most basic of those rules is to 
accord statutory language its plain meaning.  The term 
“location” is commonly defined to mean “[a] particular 
place or position” . . . and “[t]he specific place or position of 
a person or thing.” . . .  Although the term “place” is 
sometimes interpreted to refer to “[a] building or area used 
for a specific purpose or activity,” . . . the term “position” 
appears to be more narrowly confined to the precise place or 
spot where a person or thing is located at a single moment in 
time.101 
After exposing the crux of the interpretative issue leading to the 
circuit split, the court went on to explain its appreciation of the Third 
Circuit’s close attention to the various definitional requirements in its 
development of a three-prong elemental test.102  The court 
specifically clarified that the Third Circuit test did not require proof 
that victims were forced to relocate inside or outside of a structure 
but rather that the test only required proof that the victim was forced 
to move from one position to another.103  In response to what the 
court considered a well-reasoned approach, the Tenth Circuit 
expressly adopted the three-prong test of Reynos in full.104  Applying 
the test to the facts of Archuleta, the court held that a defendant who 
forced two bank employees to move from the lobby to the teller area 
to the vault within a single bank location at gunpoint satisfied the 
definitional requirements of the abduction enhancement.105 
In summary, the circuits are split on the interpretation of the 
abduction enhancement attached to the underlying crime of robbery 
primarily due to a difference in the interpretation of the term 
location.106  The various interpretations span a wide spectrum.107  On 
101. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
102. See id. at 1288.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 1288−89.
106. See supra notes 67−105 and accompanying text.
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one end of the spectrum lies the interpretation that simply deems a 
singular structure to be a singular location.108  A more neutral 
interpretation puts in place a three-prong test to allow both a degree 
of flexibility and a degree of uniformity while attempting to maintain 
integrity in the definitional requirements of the enhancement,109 and 
finally, on the other end of the spectrum lies the entirely flexible, 
case-by-case approach shared by several circuits.110  
V. THE STATED GOALS OF THE CRIMINAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES DEMAND A RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT ON THE ABDUCTION ENHANCEMENT
In considering the varied approaches taken by the federal circuit 
courts in the application of the abduction enhancement,111 it is useful 
to examine the implications this lack of uniformity has on the stated 
goals of the federal sentencing guidelines.112  Through this 
examination, it will become evident that without the emergence of a 
resolution in the circuit split the integrity of past congressional efforts 
to reform federal sentencing guidelines will be undermined.113 
A. The Primary Goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Congress had two primary, explicit purposes in the enactment of
the 1984 Sentencing Act.114  Firstly, Congress was concerned with 
“honesty in sentencing” and secondly, with the reduction of 
“unjustifiably wide sentencing disparity.”115  The first objective, 
honesty in sentencing, was accomplished in a straightforward, 
simplistic manner.116  Congress abolished federal parole to ensure 
that a sentence given by a judge would be served in full, thereby 
making sentencing more predictable for judges, the offender, and the 
public.117 
In contrast, the effort to reduce sentencing disparity through the 
creation of uniform punishments for identical crimes has proven to be 
107. See supra notes 67−105 and accompanying text.
108. See supra Section IV.A.
109. See supra Section IV.B.1.
110. See supra Sections IV.B.2−4.
111. See supra Part IV.
112. See infra Section V.C.
113. See infra Sections V.A−C.
114. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
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much more complex.118  The aim of reducing sentencing disparity 
has suffered under the weight of another competing goal of the 
sentencing system: proportionality.119  In an effort to avoid the 
inevitable inequities that arise when similar, but not identical, crimes 
are grouped and punished accordingly, various sentencing 
perspectives are used to ensure punishment is precisely proportional 
to the unique circumstances of each offense.120  As more 
distinguishing factors are incorporated into a court’s sentencing 
considerations, the goal of proportionality is further realized, but the 
predictability and uniformity of the sentencing system declines.121 
B. The Implication of Sentencing Enhancements Generally on the
Goals of Federal Sentencing
Most notably, sentencing enhancements often result in unwarranted 
sentencing disparity in an effort to serve the competing goal of 
proportionality.122  This disparity originates with the charging 
discretion granted to prosecutors.123  Prosecutors enjoy three options 
in the use of sentencing enhancements.124  They may either “(1) 
charge sentencing enhancements in all possible cases; (2) refuse to 
charge sentencing enhancements; or (3) charge sentencing 
enhancements only in selected cases.”125  Although options one or 
two would significantly reduce sentencing disparity, it is apparent 
that Congress desired prosecutors to make case-by-case decisions on 
the appropriateness of enhancements by requiring prosecutorial 
action to trigger the enhancements.126  As a result of prosecutorial 
discretion:  
Defendants with vastly different levels of culpability can 
receive essentially identical sentences.  Defendants with 
essentially identical levels of culpability can receive vastly 
different sentences.  And, even putting questions of 
118. See id. at 13.
119. See id. at 4, 13.
120. See id. at 13.
121. See id.
122. See Simons, supra note 54, at 330−31.
123. See id. at 335.  “Sentencing enhancements create a system where prosecutors
effectively choose the sentence. . . . Moreover, because sentencing enhancements
increase sentences so dramatically, they create a real risk that sentences will be
unfairly disparate or unjustly severe.”  Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 335−36.
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uniformity and disparity aside, the indiscriminate use of 
sentencing enhancements can lead to extraordinarily harsh 
sentences that are grossly out of proportion to the 
defendant’s conduct and difficult to justify under any 
principled theory of punishment.127 
Therefore, sentencing enhancements in practice often hinder, rather 
than advance, the primary goal of the federal sentencing guidelines to 
reduce sentencing disparity and may even fail to advance secondary 
goals such as proportionality.128  
C. The Implication of the Nonuniform Application of the Abduction
Sentencing Enhancement on the Goals of Federal Sentencing
If the general use of sentencing enhancements frequently results in 
a lack of sentencing uniformity, it logically follows that the deeply 
divergent application of a particular sentencing enhancement by the 
federal circuits generates yet another substantial layer of sentencing 
disparity.129  Therefore, while sentencing enhancements will likely 
remain a fundamental aspect of federal criminal sentencing without 
substantial reform,130 it is imperative that, at a minimum, a uniform 
approach emerges from the federal circuits on the issue of the 
abduction enhancement in order to maximize sentencing uniformity 
among crimes of robbery.131  
VI. THE DANGER OF DOUBLE COUNTING REQUIRES THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE ABDUCTION
ENHANCEMENT BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF FINDING
MOVEMENT BETWEEN ROOMS IN A SINGULAR
STRUCTURE TO BE INSUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE
ABDUCTION
Although it is apparent that the stated goals of the federal criminal 
sentencing guidelines render necessary a resolution of the circuit split 
on the issue of the abduction enhancement, the issue of double 
counting assists in the articulation of the optimal resolution.132 
127. Id. at 341.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Simons, supra note 54, at 329.
131. See supra notes 111−30 and accompanying text.
132. See infra Sections VI.A−C.
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A. Double Counting Defined
Double counting refers to the application of “the Guidelines in a
way that accounts for the same aspects of a defendant’s conduct more 
than once to increase the severity of a sentence.”133  Predictably, 
defendants often argue that double punishment for the same conduct 
is impermissible.134  
As was the case when examining the issue of sentencing goals, the 
concern of proportionality arises when considering double 
counting.135  Often, various sentencing guidelines contain 
overlapping characteristics in response to the same underlying 
concern.136  This can result in an accumulation of different offenses 
or enhancements, which amount to excessive punishments when 
viewed in light of the “real blameworthiness of a defendant’s 
conduct.”137  In short, when double counting is employed, it results in 
disproportionately severe sentences because of stacked penalties for 
the same conduct.138 
B. United States v. Eubanks
The 2010 Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Eubanks
provides a useful illustration of the danger of double counting.139  In 
Eubanks, the defendant committed a string of robberies, and in each 
robbery the defendant forced store employees to move around to 
various parts of the store.140  In one instance, the forced movement 
was from the front of the store to the back of the store, and in another 
instance, it was from the front of the store to a back room within the 
same building.141  In both instances, the defendant used a gun to 
induce the movement.142 
In Eubanks, the Seventh Circuit grappled with the appropriate 
enhancement to apply to the defendant’s charge.143  Under these 
133. Carolyn Barth, Note, Aggravated Assaults with Chairs Versus Guns: Impermissible
Applied Double Counting Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 99 MICH. L. REV. 183,
186 (2000).
134. See id.
135. Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT’G. REP. 249, 252 (2005).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id.; see also Barth, supra note 133, at 186.
139. See United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010).
140. Id. at 648.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 652.
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facts, the court recognized that both the abduction enhancement, 
which is a four-point enhancement carrying more penalty, and the 
restraint enhancement, which is a two-point enhancement carrying 
less penalty, would be applicable.144  The court further 
acknowledged, “the line between a restraint and an abduction is a bit 
hazy,” noting that the restraint enhancement applies when a victim is 
tied, bound, or locked up while the abduction enhancement applies 
when the defendant forcibly removes the victim to another 
location.145  While the Seventh Circuit did not ultimately choose to 
apply both enhancements, this case helps demonstrate a scenario 
where if the prosecutor was inclined to charge and the court was 
inclined to convict, so the same conduct could be punished under two 
separate sentencing enhancements.146 
C. The Danger of Double Counting Requires a Clear Distinction
Between the Abduction Enhancement and Other Similar
Sentencing Enhancements
Undoubtedly, this scenario presented in the Eubanks case is not 
novel.147  Many robberies entail the defendant forcefully directing 
victims to another part of a store or bank.148  In each of these 
situations, double counting becomes a concern because the force used 
to persuade a victim to physically move may be punished under the 
restraint enhancement while the movement itself may be punished 
under the abduction enhancement.149 
Although not all circuits permit double counting, many do under 
certain circumstances.150  If the guideline provision at issue 
specifically prohibits double counting, all the federal circuits have 
determined it to be impermissible.151  If, however, there is no explicit 
prohibition in the guideline provision, the circuits have adopted 
various approaches.152  Some circuits will always allow double 
counting in the absence of an explicit prohibition.153  Other circuits 
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 654.
147. See id. at 653 (stating this case is indistinguishable from other cases).
148. See supra Part IV.
149. See Eubanks, 593 F.3d at 652.
150. See Barth, supra note 133, at 186–87.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 187.
153. See id.
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will always prohibit it regardless, and remaining circuits have not 
adopted a stance.154 
Therefore, in cases that mirror Eubanks factually, it is imperative 
that the issue of double counting be addressed in order to ensure 
balanced and just sentencing outcomes.155  While, it is clear that the 
abduction enhancement should be utilized where applicable, and it is 
equally clear that in order to achieve uniform and fair sentencing, it 
must not be utilized in conjunction with other enhancements seeking 
to punish the same characteristic, particularly the restraint 
enhancement.156   
In summary, the sentencing enhancements must be interpreted and 
implemented uniformly to prevent overlapping enhancements that 
produce skewed, unfair, and widely diverse sentencing outcomes for 
abduction enhancements in robbery convictions.157  If a victim is 
moved between distinct locations, such as from inside a structure to 
outside that structure, then separate conduct exists to justify the 
abduction enhancement.158  However, if the defendant is merely 
forcing a victim to move to a separate part of the same structure for 
the purpose of restraining or controlling the victim during the course 
of the robbery, then no distinct conduct exists beyond what the 
restraint enhancement is meant to capture.159 
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, widespread nonuniformity in the application of the
abduction enhancement creates unwarranted sentencing disparity.160  
This disparity in turn undermines the stated goals of the sentencing 
guidelines enacted by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.161  Therefore, in order to maintain the integrity of extensive 
sentencing reform efforts, the lack of uniformity must be resolved.162  
154. Id.
155. See O’Hear, supra note 135, at 252 (stating that double counting can result in lesser
crimes being enhanced in an unbalanced fashion).  As an alternative example under
the robbery guideline, the abduction and weaponry enhancements together enhance
the crime ten levels while causing a life-threatening bodily injury only enhances it by
six levels.  Id.
156. See supra notes 139−49 and accompanying text.
157. See O’Hear, supra note 135, at 252.
158. See supra Part III.
159. See supra Part III.
160. See supra Part V.
161. See supra Part V.
162. See supra Part V.
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Various approaches to the application of the abduction 
enhancement have emerged among the federal circuits,163 but the 
issue of double counting illuminates the most appropriate outcome in 
the search for a unified approach.164  To avoid the danger of double 
counting, the abduction enhancement must be distinguished from 
other similar enhancements.165  Therefore, the circuit split should be 
resolved in favor of limiting the application of the abduction 
enhancement to situations involving the forced movement of victims 
by the defendant from, to, or in between separate and distinct 
structures.166  This is the only consistent theory of application of the 
abduction enhancement that will decrease disparity of sentencing and 
increase predictability among cases of robbery involving 
abduction.167 
163. See supra Part IV.
164. See supra Part VI.
165. See supra Section VI.C.
166. See supra Section VI.C.
167. See supra Part VI.
